The model applied to
live events.
Every figure is a model output. Every assumption is stated. Every number can be run with your own inputs in a demo session. Analysis is published as events warrant.
Analysis is published when a live event warrants it: a corridor disruption, a policy shift, a market dislocation. Papers are not time-sensitive commentary. They are applied scenario analysis that remains useful as long as the structural dependency it models is unchanged.
Tags allow you to find all papers relevant to a corridor, commodity, vessel class, or topic regardless of when they were published.
A hypothetical Suezmax loads Saudi crude at Yanbu with Bab el-Mandeb closed. Following one voyage shows five limits: the pipeline, the Suez size limit, a route 123% longer, a chain of tail chokepoints and the price of cover. It also shows where the exposure accumulates across lines of business.
Crude, LNG, and fertilizer have all converged on a 7-day export average of zero. That looks like total collapse read as one number, but the three commodities got there by different paths, and zero on the tracker is not zero for whoever is on the other end of the trade.
Blocked at Panama in 2023, the intuitive workaround was Cape Horn. Almost nobody sailed it: the distances say otherwise. The fleet went east instead, traded one chokepoint for four, then lost one of those to war risk and had to move again.
Urea and sulphur from the Gulf are a live, underdiscussed piece of the Hormuz disruption. The country-level dependency figures overstate it, because part of the Gulf's fertilizer trade, Oman's, never crosses the strait at all.
A drought scenario is not binary. The 2023 El Niño cut transits by 36% over nine months, shifted 100M tonnes of grain to longer routes, and imposed a freight cost penalty that fell hardest on importers with no land alternative. Live update: the throttle has already started, a year ahead of the model's own prior projection.
Every risk report cites the same number: roughly 80 percent of China's energy imports transit Malacca. The Narrows CDM puts China's structural crude dependency at 46.2 percent. The gap between those two numbers is where mispriced accumulation risk lives.
A CIA assessment gives Iran 3 to 4 months of runway. That is long enough to exhaust strategic petroleum reserves in most exposed importers. The model identifies which importers carry the highest bilateral crude and LPG exposure, at what percentage of total seaborne supply, and what supply substitution actually costs.
Three pillars, Chinese demand reduction, pipeline rerouting, and Atlantic Basin supply growth, explain why aggregate oil markets have not collapsed. They do not explain who remains exposed. The bilateral data does.
Why the BDTI tells you tanker rates are up 156% but not which importers face binary exposure. The toll breakeven, the LNG no-route problem, and the forward scenario matrix by importer.
Indonesia floated a Malacca transit fee. The question did not go away when they walked it back. The model calculates the diversion threshold by vessel class, the bilateral dependency matrix, and what the CII slow-steaming adjustment does to the Lombok detour cost.
Thailand's land bridge is a real project with real geopolitical logic, but it is built around containers. Malacca's dependency in the model sits in crude, refined products and LNG. The model shows what the land bridge does and does not change for underwriters and commodity desks.
The Chokepoint Dependency Model was locked before the Houthi Red Sea campaign and Panama Canal drought began. Two disruptions then unfolded in the precise corridors the model covers. Here is a systematic account of what the model predicted and what the disruptions confirmed.