The analytical gap

What market indices can tell you, and what they cannot.

The UNCTAD Strait of Hormuz Dashboard, launched 28 April 2026, aggregates the market signal clearly. The Baltic Dirty Tanker Index stands at 2,795, against a 2024 average of 1,091. VLSFO bunker in Singapore has risen from a 2024 average of $571 per tonne to $1,076. Brent crude has traded above $120 on intraday peaks. These are the right numbers to watch. They confirm severity. They do not distribute it.

An accumulation underwriter pricing a P&I book, a crude desk managing a supply position, or a lender stress-testing a fleet facility needs something the index cannot provide: which specific counterparties carry Hormuz exposure, for which commodity, at what percentage of their total seaborne supply, and whether any rerouting option exists at all. Aggregate indices are inputs to that question. Run it through The Narrows and you get the answer.

The first thing The Narrows establishes is that Hormuz is not one risk. It is two fundamentally different risks sharing a geography. For crude petroleum, a disruption creates a painful, calculable rerouting problem. For LNG, it creates something categorically different: a supply halt with no commercial solution at any price.

LNG — binary constraint
No Cape option. No toll threshold. No calculation to run.
Laden LNG carriers cannot economically complete a Cape of Good Hope rerouting. Boil-off gas loss over an 18-day detour is commercially prohibitive. Long-term supply contracts specify fixed destinations. Spot substitution at scale does not exist. Qatar's 100% Hormuz dependency is not a cost figure. It is a categorical absence of alternatives. If Hormuz closes, Gulf LNG does not move.
Qatar dependency: 100% · No reroute at any toll level
Crude petroleum — costly reroute
Cape option exists. At $3.5M per VLCC voyage at current rates.
Laden VLCCs can route via Cape of Good Hope, adding 18 days on a Gulf-to-Japan voyage. At current market rates, VLSFO at $1,076 per tonne and charter rates consistent with BDTI 2,795, the rerouting costs approximately $3.5M per voyage. This is the toll breakeven: above $3.5M, Cape diversion becomes commercially rational. Below it, operators pay the toll and continue through Hormuz.
Cape reroute: $3.5M/voyage · Breakeven toll: ~$3.5M
The critical distinction
These two situations require entirely different analytical frameworks. For crude, the question is: at what toll level does rerouting become rational? For LNG, there is no equivalent question. The Cape is not an option at any toll level. Treating Hormuz as a single "rerouting risk" systematically undercounts the LNG exposure and misleads the crude analysis. Run them through The Narrows separately.

The bilateral dependency matrix

Who is exposed, for what commodity, and whether any alternative exists.

The Narrows model produces bilateral dependency figures at the (importer, chokepoint, commodity) level. The table below shows Hormuz dependency for LNG and crude separately, because the rerouting column means something fundamentally different for each. These figures are drawn from 2023 UN Comtrade bilateral data and represent the structural dependency pattern, not live cargo positions.

Bilateral Hormuz dependency matrix — selected importers, 2023
Importer Commodity Hormuz dep. Annual exposure 30-day VaR Alternative?
LNG — liquefied natural gas (HS 271111) · No Cape option at any toll level
JapanLNG (LNG carrier) 22% $20.2B $1.7B None. Supply halt.
South KoreaLNG (LNG carrier) 26% $10.9B $897M None. Supply halt.
IndiaLNG (LNG carrier) 48% $8.6B $707M None. Supply halt.
ChinaLNG (LNG carrier) 15% $9.1B $748M None. Supply halt.
United KingdomLNG (LNG carrier) 35% $4.6B $378M None. Supply halt.
Crude petroleum (HS 2709) · Cape of Good Hope available at $3.5M per VLCC voyage (current rates)
JapanCrude petroleum (VLCC) 84% $74.2B $6.1B Cape: $3.5M/voyage
IndiaCrude petroleum (VLCC) 58% $57.6B $4.7B Cape: $3.5M/voyage
ChinaCrude petroleum (VLCC) 38% $76.1B $6.3B Cape: $3.5M/voyage
South KoreaCrude petroleum (VLCC) 72% $43.1B $3.5B Cape: $3.5M/voyage

The forward scenarios

What continuation costs, by commodity, for specific importers.

The Narrows model translates disruption severity into bilateral cost for specific counterparties across time horizons and toll scenarios. Japan is the primary example because it carries the highest absolute Hormuz exposure of any single importer across both LNG and crude petroleum. The figures are calculated separately by commodity, because the cost structures are not comparable.

For crude, rerouting costs are recalculated at current market rates: VLSFO at $1,076 per tonne and charter rates consistent with BDTI 2,795. These are approximately 1.9x and 2.5x their 2024 baselines. For LNG, there are no rerouting costs to calculate. The VaR figures represent supply that cannot move, not supply that moves at a premium.

Scenario matrix — Japan combined Hormuz exposure (LNG + crude petroleum), 2023 bilateral data
Scenario Duration Japan VaR (combined) Crude: Cape reroute per VLCC LNG constraint
14-day disruption2 weeks $3.6B $3.5M per voyage No alternative. Terminal inventories stressed.
30-day disruption1 month $7.7B $3.5M per voyage No alternative. Inventory exhaustion begins.
60-day disruption2 months $15.5B $3.5M per voyage No alternative. No substitute at scale.
90-day disruption3 months $23.2B $3.5M per voyage No alternative. Structural supply gap.
Toll scenarios — crude petroleum only. LNG toll calculations do not apply.
$500k toll per vesselOngoing $400M/yr Cape costs 7x more Crude operators comply; LNG toll analysis not applicable
$1M toll per vesselOngoing $800M/yr Cape costs 3.5x more Crude operators comply; LNG toll analysis not applicable
$2M toll per vesselOngoing $1.6B/yr Cape costs 1.75x more Still below Cape breakeven for crude; LNG toll analysis not applicable
$3.5M toll per vesselOngoing $2.8B/yr At Cape breakeven Cape diversion rational for crude above this level; LNG unaffected by toll level
The breakeven insight — crude only
At pre-crisis rates, a $1 million toll per vessel was approaching the Cape rerouting breakeven for crude tankers. At current market rates, VLSFO at $1,076 per tonne and BDTI at 2,795, the Cape reroute costs approximately $3.5 million per VLCC voyage. The toll threshold for rational crude diversion has shifted upward by roughly 75% since the disruption began. For LNG, this analysis does not apply. There is no toll level at which Cape rerouting becomes rational for laden LNG carriers. The two commodities sharing the same strait face entirely different risk structures.

The alternative pathways

What each vessel class can do, and what it costs.

The vessel cards below make the commodity distinction concrete. The VLCC (crude) card shows a painful but solvable rerouting problem. The LNG carrier card shows something categorically different. The Capesize card applies to Gulf-origin bulk cargo such as fertiliser and grain, where the Cape alternative also exists at cost.

Tanker — crude petroleum
VLCC
AlternativeCape of Good Hope
Extra days (Gulf to Japan)+18 days
Extra bunker (current VLSFO)$1.74M
Extra charter (current BDTI)$1.76M
Total reroute cost$3.5M per voyage
Toll breakeven~$3.5M
Costly. Cape viable above $3.5M toll.
LNG carrier
Q-Flex / Q-Max
Alternative routeNone
Cape boil-off lossCommercially prohibitive
Contract structureLong-term, fixed destination
Spot substitute at scaleDoes not exist
Toll breakevenNo calculation applies
Binary. No reroute at any toll level.
Bulk carrier — fertiliser / grain
Capesize
AlternativeCape of Good Hope
Extra days+14 days
Extra bunker (current)$960k
Extra charter (current)$700k
Total reroute cost$1.66M per voyage
Toll breakeven~$1.7M
Costly. Cape viable above $1.7M toll.

The transition fuel dimension

LNG is the IMO bridge fuel. The bridge runs through Hormuz.

IMO's revised GHG Strategy targets net-zero emissions from international shipping by 2050. Carbon Intensity Indicator regulations, effective from 2023, have pushed operators toward LNG as the primary compliant fuel available at scale for deep-sea voyages. LNG-fuelled vessels now represent over 40% of new deep-sea tonnage ordered. This energy transition creates a second-order Hormuz dependency that is not visible in the standard exposure model.

As the global fleet converts to LNG propulsion, the nature of Hormuz exposure changes. It is no longer only a cargo risk for energy-importing nations. It becomes a propulsion risk for the fleet itself. A sustained Hormuz disruption simultaneously reduces LNG cargo supply and restricts the fuel supply for vessels designed to run on LNG. The ships most affected by cargo disruption are increasingly the same ships that require LNG to operate.

The compound risk
The standard assumption in energy transition analysis is that decarbonisation reduces fossil fuel concentration risk. For LNG and Hormuz, the opposite is true. Each vessel that converts from heavy fuel oil to LNG propulsion reduces carbon intensity and simultaneously increases its structural exposure to a single 33-kilometre channel. A slower, more decarbonised fleet is a more Hormuz-dependent fleet.

The forward-look capability

What The Narrows adds that market data cannot provide.

The UNCTAD Hormuz Dashboard provides a clear real-time read on market-level disruption. The Narrows model operates at a different analytical layer: bilateral, commodity-specific, and scenario-driven. The dashboard tells you the aggregate signal. The Narrows tells you which counterparty carries which exposure, at what percentage of supply, and whether any rerouting option exists at all for that specific commodity.

What each analytical layer provides
Analytical questionMarket index / dashboardThe Narrows
Is there a disruption?Yes: BDTI, bunker prices, BrentNot the primary instrument
How severe is the aggregate impact?Yes: index levels vs. baselinesNot the primary instrument
Which importer carries the highest exposure?Cannot answerBilateral dependency by country and commodity
What % of this importer's supply is at risk?Cannot answerDependency % at (importer, chokepoint, commodity) level
Does LNG have a rerouting option?Cannot answerCategorical no. Binary constraint, not a cost threshold.
What does 30 days of disruption cost this counterparty?Cannot answerValue at risk by duration, vessel class, and commodity
At what toll level does crude rerouting become rational?Cannot answerToll threshold per vessel class at live market rates
What are costs if disruption drags 60 or 90 days?Cannot answer forward scenariosDuration scenario matrix at any input assumption

The model assumptions are substitutable. Charter rates, bunker prices, disruption duration, and toll level are all variable inputs. Replace the default vessel-class rates with your own book rates and rerun the exposure calculation. This is the capability that aggregate market data, however current, cannot replicate. Run your Hormuz exposure through The Narrows before you price it.

Methodology and data sources
Bilateral dependency figures derived from the Narrows Chokepoint Dependency Simulation Model. Primary data source: UN Comtrade 2023 bilateral import data via Comtrade v3 public API, covering LNG (HS 271111), crude petroleum (HS 2709), and refined petroleum (HS 2710). Data quality: Tier 1 bilateral data for 10 of 11 EU reporters and all major non-EU importers. France remains at Tier 3 world aggregate pending 2023 Comtrade submission. Capacity sensitivity score of 1.00 for Hormuz reflects the absence of any navigable alternative for laden VLCCs or LNG carriers exiting the Persian Gulf. LNG rerouting assessment is categorical: Cape of Good Hope is not commercially viable for laden LNG carriers at any realistic voyage duration due to boil-off gas loss rates and long-term contract constraints. Rerouting costs recalculated at current market rates: VLSFO Singapore $1,076 per tonne (LSEG Data & Analytics via UNCTAD Hormuz Dashboard, April 2026); charter rates consistent with BDTI 2,795. VLCC assumptions: 90 tonnes per day fuel consumption, 18 extra days Gulf to Japan via Cape. All scenario figures represent the value of foregone imports during the stated disruption period. 22 chokepoints modelled. All model assumptions are substitutable.