We built the model on 2023 data.
Then 2024 happened.

The model predicted $1.4 million per voyage via the Cape. Actuals came in at $1.0–1.4 million. This is the cleanest result.

When a loaded tanker can no longer transit Bab-el-Mandeb and the Suez Canal, the alternative is the Cape of Good Hope route around the southern tip of Africa. The detour is long: for a large oil tanker travelling from the Persian Gulf to a European destination, rerouting via the Cape adds approximately 14 days of sea time.

At the vessel operating costs built into the model ($55,000 per day in fuel and $45,000 per day in time charter equivalent), 14 additional days produces a per-voyage premium of $1.4 million. This calculation was made before the Red Sea disruption and published as a model output.

UNCTAD's impact assessment of the Red Sea disruption, published in early 2024, reported that rerouting added approximately $1 million per voyage in fuel costs alone, with total additional costs reaching $1.0 to $1.4 million depending on vessel class. World Bank analysis produced consistent figures. The model's $1.4 million estimate sits at the top of the reported range, which is consistent: the model uses the largest tanker class (VLCCs, which carry around 2 million barrels of crude) as its reference vessel, while the published averages cover a broader mix of vessel sizes.

The model covers rerouting cost per bulk voyage. It does not model aggregate container market pricing, which reflects fleet capacity dynamics rather than individual voyage economics.

The model ranked Greece as the most exposed European crude importer. The disruption confirmed it.

The model uses real bilateral trade data (actual country-to-country import flows from UN Comtrade) to calculate each importer's dependency on a given corridor. For Bab-el-Mandeb crude, the European ordering was stark: Greece at 54.6% dependency, France at 13.4%, Germany at 6.6%. Greece's exposure was more than four times France's and more than eight times Germany's.

The underlying reason is geography and sourcing. Greek independent refiners source heavily from Persian Gulf producers (Saudi Arabia, Iraq, the UAE) whose cargoes transit Bab-el-Mandeb on the way to Europe. French and German operators have more access to Atlantic Basin alternatives: Azerbaijani crude via the Bosphorus, Norwegian crude from the North Sea, pipeline routes from Kazakhstan. When the Red Sea corridor came under attack, those alternatives provided meaningful insulation. Greece had fewer of them.

This is precisely what the disruption produced. Greek independent refiners reported acute supply chain pressure through the first half of 2024. Greece's shipping industry, the world's largest commercial fleet by deadweight tonnage, bore a disproportionate operational cost burden as tanker operators were forced around the Cape. France and Germany reported materially lower disruption consistent with the model's much lower dependency scores for both countries.

Tier 1 bilateral data. UN Comtrade 2023. Observed impact characterisations from World Bank, UNCTAD, EIA, and industry reporting through H1 2024.

The model identified crude oil as 78% of Bab-el-Mandeb exposure. The disruption confirmed crude dominance, with an honest caveat on containers.

Of the model's total Bab-el-Mandeb bilateral exposure across covered importers ($74.7 billion), crude petroleum accounts for $58.3 billion: 78%. Vehicles, palm oil, and copper ores make up most of the remainder. The model's prediction: if Bab fails, crude supply chains bear the largest financial impact.

The disruption confirmed this in dollar terms. The Red Sea corridor's share of global seaborne crude volumes fell from approximately 12% in April 2023 to 6% in August 2024, a halving of crude transit consistent with the scale of exposure the model identifies. The EIA, IEA, and Kpler all confirmed significant declines in seaborne crude via the corridor.

Where the picture is more complex: container tonnage at Suez fell 82% at its February 2024 trough, a steeper proportional decline than crude in volume terms. The model covers container goods at Bab in lower-confidence estimates (vehicles, electronics, apparel), but its non-crude coverage is narrower than the full containerised goods universe transiting the corridor. The model's $74.7 billion total should be read as a floor on trade at risk, not a ceiling.

The Panama drought hit LNG hardest: transits fell 66%. The model ranked LNG as the largest Panama exposure by dollar value. This is the second clean validation.

The Panama Canal drought cut daily transits from 36–38 in July 2023 to 18 per day by February 2024. Among all commodity classes transiting the canal, liquefied natural gas fell hardest: the Canal Authority reported a 66% decline in LNG transits, the single largest proportional drop of any cargo type.

LNG carriers (vessels that move gas cooled to minus 162 degrees Celsius in insulated tanks) are largely captive to the Panama route for US Gulf to Asian Pacific deliveries. Unlike bulk vessels, they cannot easily divert to alternative routes without transforming the economics of the voyage entirely. Japan and South Korea, which import significant volumes of US LNG through the canal, reported elevated LNG spot prices and accelerated purchases from alternative suppliers through the first half of 2024.

The model's Panama rankings, calibrated against Panama Canal Authority tonnage data, place LNG and LPG as the largest dollar-value exposure: China at $8.3 billion, Japan at $5.1 billion, South Korea at $4.8 billion. The 2024 drought confirmed LNG as the single most impacted commodity class, precisely matching the model's ranking.

Panama LNG / LPG adj. exposure includes China ($8.3B), Japan ($5.1B), South Korea ($4.8B), Mexico ($1.9B), Indonesia ($1.5B) and others. ACP FY2024 annual data confirms LNG as top impacted commodity class.